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Abstract
Financial distribution where the distributor is the agent of both
the product provider and customer has been found to inherently work
against the interests of customers, in the form of high service fees
and perverse incentives in sales practices. This paper proposes seg-
regation of ﬁnancial advice from ﬁnancial distribution. It proposes a
Financial Advisers Bill, 2012, to promote the development of a mar-
ket for advice. The Bill suggests that ﬁnancial advisers be recognised
as professionals and be regulated under a new statutory body called
the Institute of Financial Advisers of India. The paper suggests that
regulation of distributors continue to remain under the purview of
product regulators. It outlines alternative models in which the distri-
bution market may be organised. It also points out that the Ministry
of Finance and the Financial Stability and Development Council need
to play a role in co-ordinating the setting of common standards for
distribution across all product regulators.
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21 Introduction
The ﬁnancial distribution industry has grown signiﬁcantly in the last decade
and stands close to Rs.230 billion at last count. For a sense of scale for the
growth in distribution, insurance companies paid their distributors approx-
imately Rs.180 billion in 2009-10, which amounted to almost seven percent
of the total premiums collected.1 Mutual funds are believed to have paid
commissions to distributors to the tune of Rs.50 billion.2
There are two causes of concern when faced with this kind of growth in
ﬁnancial distribution: ﬁrstly, this growth has had little impact on household
participation in the ﬁnancial sector. Only one percent of all households
report having investments in mutual funds in the quarter of June 2011 and
26 percent in the case of insurance3, despite savings being at 34 percent of
GDP.4
Secondly, this growth has taken place under a regime of lax monitoring and
low regulation. The distribution industry has been subject to several allega-
tions of mis-selling, at the point of sale, or during the product cycle, or some-
times both.5 Anagol and Kim (2011) document one example of shrouding
by Indian mutual funds where they estimate investors lost US$500 million.
Concerns regarding the manner of selling insurance through banks have also
surfaced in the last few years (Chapter 8, IRDA (2011)). These concerns have
been raised, not just in India, but all over the world, and have accelerated
post the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
What raises the seriousness of these concerns is that it cannot be solved
by the traditional ﬁnancial markets solution of competition leading to best-
practices. The complicated nature of ﬁnancial products, and their postponed
pay-oﬀ make it diﬃcult for customers to evaluate their choices objectively.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that in a market with a mix of sophisticated
1Source: Product Disclosure Reports of Insurance Companies.
2The top 500 distributors earned about Rs.18 billion in 2010-11. Source: AMFI.
3Consumer Pyramids, CMIE. Table A.1 in the appendix presents the pattern of invest-
ments of Indian households.
4Table A10, Economic Survey 2010-11.
5Typical complaints include customers not been given correct information about prod-
ucts, not shown the full array of products, not told the exact amount of their contributions
that will be diverted towards commissions, not made clear about the exact contract that
they are signing into, made to churn their portfolios without any apparent beneﬁt to them.
3and naive customers, ﬁrms choose to shroud information not leading to a low-
cost equilibrium. Greater competition therefore does not necessarily ensure
better outcomes for the customer. This only underscores the importance
of policy that engenders an environment where ﬁnancial intermediaries are
responsive to customer needs and also respectful of customer rights (Khorana,
Servaes, and Tufano, 2009).
In the current distribution model, the intermediary sells to the consumer but
is remunerated by the manufacturer. Thus, advice (which distributors deliver
today) is likely to be biased because the incentive comes not from higher sales
driven by customer satisfaction, but from commissions paid by the product
provider. These misaligned incentives generate eﬀort in promoting products
with no regard to the suitability of the product for the customer.6
This is exacerbated through what is typically called the “common agency”7
problem. An example in India is an agent who can sell products of several
mutual funds and an insurance company. Investors can receive very diﬀerent
information about products, which are similar in economic terms, depending
on which product provider is paying a higher commission. Stoughton, Wu,
and Zechner (2011) ﬁnd that kick-backs to advisers from product providers
are always associated with higher portfolio management fees and negatively
impact fund performance, regardless of investor sophistication.
While there is consensus on the problems in the distribution space, the so-
lutions are not so obvious. Regulations may make the market for customers
“safer”, but often have unintended consequences of potentially stiﬂing inno-
vation (Inderst, 2009). In India, the diﬃculty is compounded by the fact that
low ﬁnancial literacy and low household participation demand a signiﬁcant
eﬀort of distribution, requiring regulation to straddle a thin line between
establishing safeguards, while not throttling the profession.
In this paper, we propose a two-fold approach. First, we suggest a complete
segregation of advice from distribution to solve the incentive-compatibility
problem. We suggest that advisers would be the agents of the customer,
while distributors would be the agents of the product provider. We propose
6Bergstresser, Chambers, and Tufano (2009) compare the performance of mutual funds
oﬀered through brokers and through direct channels. They ﬁnd that risk-adjusted returns
are lower for funds oﬀered through brokers.
7Common agency models are those where multiple principals compete to inﬂuence an
agent’s decision.
4a Financial Advisers Bill, 2012 which provides for the setting up of a pro-
fessional body called the Institute of Financial Advisers of India (IFAI) to
develop and regulate the profession of advice.
We then deliberate on various ways in which the present market for distri-
bution may be organised. The options include a tied-agency model where
the distributor is tied to a product provider and is only remunerated by the
same. A distributor selling products of multiple product providers is auto-
matically deemed to be an adviser and is regulated more stringently. This
model accommodates both advisory ﬁrms as well as individual advisers, who
can also execute their advice for their client. Regardless of that might be
adopted eventually, we recommend that the Financial Stability and Devel-
opment Council (FSDC) play an important role in inﬂuencing the setting up
of common standards for distribution in the immediate future.
The paper presents the status of ﬁnancial product advice and distribution
in India and the policy debate on these issues in Section 2. We outline a
broad approach in Section 3 which includes segregating advice from distribu-
tion. Section 3.1 discusses our proposed solution for regulating advice. The
possible models for regulating distribution are explained in Section 3.2, and
implementation issues in Section 3.3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Financial product advice and distribution
in India
The approach to ﬁnancial regulation in India, like in many markets, is ori-
ented towards product regulation. Thus, among the typical savings and
investment products in India, we ﬁnd:
• Fixed deposits, regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI),8
• Small savings products, provided by the Government of India9,
8Other important classes of products are loans including home loans, that fall under
consumer credit and fall under the purview of the Reserve Bank of India, or the National
Housing Bank.
9These products oﬀer an administered rate of return which is paid out of the Consoli-
dated Fund of India. These include Postal Savings, National Savings Certiﬁcate and the
Public Provident Fund.
5• Mutual funds and Collective Investment Schemes, regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI),
• Insurance products, both life and general, regulated by the Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), and
• The New Pension System (NPS), regulated by the Pension Fund Reg-
ulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA).
This approach, where each product is separately regulated, in the primary
mandate of customer protection misses out a crucial fact that all these prod-
ucts have to be sold to the end customer, which includes elements of ﬁnancial
advice and distribution. These elements of advice and distribution ought to
be treated in a common manner for all ﬁnancial services. However, in the
current regulatory approach, the focus ends up being primarily on regula-
tion of the product and the producer with very little focus on the mode of
ﬁnancial advice and distribution. In addition, each regulator has a diﬀerent
approach to these elements of the business.
In this section, we document how these two elements of ﬁnancial advice and
distribution are practised in India. In the matter of ﬁnancial distribution,
the speciﬁc focus is restricted to the distribution of mutual funds, life insur-
ance products and the NPS. On the other hand, the discussion pertaining to
ﬁnancial advisers encompass advising on all products.
2.1 Distribution channels
Financial products are sold by an army of distributors. These distributors
are employees or agents of the product provider and not of the customer
i.e., the remuneration of the distributor comes from commissions paid by the
provider. The only exception is the NPS where pension funds are restricted to
only managing investments. Customer interface is handled by entities called
as “points-of-presence” (PoPs),10 which are designated bank and other oﬃces
authorized to sell the NPS.
The distribution channel includes diﬀerent kinds of entities. Most typical
are Independent Financial Advisers (IFAs) and corporations, which include
banks and other entities, and brokers. As of March 2009, the mutual fund
10See Shah (2006) for a detailed description of the NPS.
6industry had 92,499 registered distributors as compared to approximately 2.9
million insurance agents and 2930 corporate agents.11
While the industry started out with IFAs, corporate agents, in recent years,
have come to play an increasingly important role in distribution. This is
especially true in the case of private sector insurance companies, which unlike
the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), are increasingly utilising the
corporate agent model. Thus, 5 percent of the total insurance premium in
2009-10 came from banks as opposed to 3 percent in 2006-07.12 Similarly,
in the case of mutual funds, banks – and private banks, in particular – have
come to dominate distribution with over 30 percent AUM share (KPMG and
CII, 2009).
There is variation in the business model across products. Insurance works
with a tied-agency model, where the distributor is an agent of only one man-
ufacturer. In recent times, there has been some debate on allowing banks to
sell products of more than one insurance ﬁrm, but a decision is still awaited
(IRDA, 2011). Mutual fund distribution is not tied: a distributor may sell
products of more than one manufacturer. Small saving agents usually only
sell products sold through post-oﬃces, but are not precluded from selling
other ﬁnancial products such as mutual funds and life insurance.
2.2 Current measures for consumer protection
In order to implement their key mandate of protecting the interests of cus-
tomers – investors in the SEBI mandate, policyholders under IRDA, pension
fund subscribers under the PFRDA – each regulator has put in place mech-
anisms to regulate the conduct of its own set of intermediaries.
What is missing is co-ordination between regulators. There is no common
standard for what is essentially the same function, i.e., distribution of ﬁnan-
cial products. What follows is a broad overview of the consumer protection
mechanisms in place, which include:
• Registration and certiﬁcation requirements;
11Table 14: Number of Individual Agents of Life Insurers, Table 15: Number of Corpo-
rate Agents of Life Insurers, Handbook on Indian Insurance Statistics 2009-10.
12Table 4: Channel Wise Individual New Business Performance Of Life Insurers, Hand-
book on Indian Insurance Statistics 2009-10.
7• Code of conduct;
• Rules on commissions and fees; and
• Grievance redressal procedures.
2.2.1 Registration and certiﬁcation requirements
Distributors in India are required to be registered by their respective regu-
lators, and undergo training to be eligible for registration. Regulators also
have the power to revoke the license thereby suspending the intermediary
from functioning in the market.
Mutual fund intermediaries need to register with the Association of Mutual
Funds of India (AMFI).13 Besides registration, intermediaries are required to
pass a certiﬁcation program.14 SEBI also has a separate category of advisers
called Portfolio Managers, who undertake the management or administra-
tion of a portfolio of securities, or funds, on behalf of the client. These are
typically managers for high net-worth individuals, and have to meet certain
capital adequacy norms in addition to other regulations related to disclosure
and governance.15
IRDA also requires agents to go through a 100 hours training, typically run
by an approved institution before passing an examination.16 The candidate
becomes the agent of one insurance company after having passed the exam-
ination.
PFRDA set up a request for proposals for banks and other agencies to obtain
a license to operate as a point-of-presence for the NPS.17 As of September
2011, 35 entities (with a total of 12,226 branches) have been given the license
to operate as a PoP and become the touch-point to existing and potential
NPS customers. In addition, the PFRDA has allowed for micro-ﬁnance (and
13It is important to note that AMFI is a trade association and not a SRO.
14This program was run by AMFI and was called the AMFI Mutual Fund Certiﬁcation
Program, but as of June 1, 2010, the mandate has been given to the National Institute of
Securities Markets (NISM).
15Schedule IV of the SEBI (Portfolio Managers) Regulations, 1993.
16Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Licensing of Insurance Agents)
Regulations, 2000.
17For detailed criteria, please refer to (PFRDA, 2010).
8other agencies) to become “aggregators” to distribute the NPS-Lite scheme to
lower income households, thereby extending formal ﬁnance to those excluded
earlier.
2.2.2 Code of conduct requirements
SEBI and IRDA have put out a code of conduct for mutual fund distribu-
tors and insurance brokers and agents respectively.18 These broadly involve
provisions related to:
• Protecting clients’ interests;
• Disclosing information related to schemes and commissions in case of
mutual funds;
• Recommending schemes “appropriate” for clients’ needs and circum-
stances and other sales practices such as explaining the contract;
• Provisions against mis-selling by asking agents to avoid misrepresenta-
tion, exaggeration, selling products solely on the basis of high commis-
sions, encouraging churning of investments so as to earn commissions;
• Training requirements of the agents;
• Practices related to renewal of policies and claims processing in case of
insurance.
In addition to the general code of conduct requirements, in August 2011,
SEBI increased the responsibility of large distributors, by making it manda-
tory for Asset Management Companies (AMCs) to conduct due-diligence on
distributors who satisfy one of the following criteria: a) have a presence in
more than 20 locations, b) have raised AUM over Rs.1 billion in the non-
institutional category including high net-worth individuals, c) received com-
mission of over Rs.10 million p.a. across industry and d) received commission
of over Rs.5 million from a single mutual fund.19 AMCs are required to en-
sure that the distributors satisfy a ‘ﬁt-and-proper’ criteria. All transactions
18SEBI Circular SEBI / IMD / CIR No. 8 / 174648 / 2009, August 27, 2009. Sched-
ule III, Insurance Regulatory And Development Authority (Insurance Brokers) Regula-
tions, 2002 and Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Licensing of Insurance
Agents) Regulations, 2000.
19SEBI Circular, Cir/ IMD/ DF/13/ 2011, August 22, 2011.
9by the distributor are to be categorised either as advisory or execution. If the
distributor has an element of advisory function, such advice will be subject
to the principle of appropriateness. If the transaction is booked as execution
only, the distributor will only be paid a ﬂat transaction charge. If the dis-
tributor believes that the transaction is not appropriate for the customer, a
written communication will still have to be made regarding the unsuitability
of the product. The impact of these on the industry and the AUM is yet to
be seen.
2.2.3 Commissions and fees
Distribution fees usually include entry loads, exit loads and trail commissions.
Each regulator stipulates the kind of fee and maximum amount that may be
paid to the distributors. The diﬀerences in the permissible amounts can be
seen from Table 1 which presents the maximum fees stipulated by each of
the regulator.
SEBI and PFRDA have strict requirements of what can be charged of cus-
tomers to pay for distribution. For example, from 1 August 2009, SEBI
banned entry loads. Exit loads of 1 percent of redemption proceeds can be
charged, and intermediaries can be paid through this amount.20 As of Au-
gust 2011, SEBI has allowed the distributor to be paid a ﬂat fee of Rs.100
per subscription of Rs.10,000 and above, and a ﬂat fee of Rs.150 for a ﬁrst
time investor in mutual funds.21
In the NPS, there have been no entry or exit loads since inception. Agent
compensation is left to the customer. The PoPs do charge an account opening
fee of Rs.40 for opening an account and Rs.20 per transaction thereafter.22
IRDA on the other hand, is seen to be less demanding in its requirements.
There is an overall cap prescribed on total charges during the term of the
policy and the entry cap is derived from that depending on the duration
of the policy. Since October 2009, the cap on charges for ULIPs is based
on the diﬀerence between gross and net yields of the product. The net
reduction in yield for policies with term less than or equal to 10 years cannot
20SEBI Circular, SEBI/IMD/CIR No. 4/ 168230/09, June 30, 2009.
21SEBI Circular, Cir/ IMD/ DF/13/ 2011, August 22, 2011.
22Source: PFRDA.
10Table 1 Maximum fees stipulated by product regulators
SEBI IRDA PFRDA Small
Savings
Entry Load 0 Upto 40% of Rs.40 1%*
premium
Exit load 1% of 0
redemption proceeds
Trail commissions 0.4-0.75% 7.5% in year two 0
5% thereafter** Rs.20 per
transaction
* For Recurring Deposit scheme it is 4 percent; For Senior Citizens Scheme it is 0.5 percent
** For ULIPs trail commission is capped at 3 percent
be more than 3 percent at maturity. For policies with term above 10 years,
the net reduction in yield at maturity cannot be more than 2.25 percent.23
While these are lower than before, they still remain higher than those on
mutual funds. In the case of insurance, concerns over high front-loading
of commissions remain, as these are allowed by The Insurance Act, 1938.
The commission for the ﬁrst year can be a maximum of 40 percent of the
premium. In years two and three, the caps are 7.5 percent, and 5 percent
thereafter.24
2.2.4 Grievance redressal systems
One of the critical elements in any regulatory system is the ability of cus-
tomers to seek redressal against wrong-doings, and for sellers to be able to
make their case. In India, regulators have a mechanism to address customer
complaints.
SEBI runs a Sebi Complaints Redress System (SCORES) website25 wherein
investors can register complaints against companies and intermediaries listed
with SEBI. It also puts out a list of issues investors should be concerned
with when investing in products registered under SEBI. This includes a brief
23Source: IRDA circular, 20/IRDA/Actl/ULIP/09-10.
24Insurance Regulatory And Development Authority (Insurance Brokers) Regulations,
2002.
25http://scores.gov.in/Default.aspx
11mention of the list of fees and charges applicable, and product characteristics
such as risk factors and asset allocation that an investor should be aware of.
IRDA runs a Grievance Cell26 that looks into complaints from policyholders.
These complaints have to be ﬁrst routed through the grievance redressal
cell at each of the life and non-life companies. If the complaint is a dispute
regarding a claim or a policy contract, policyholders are required to approach
quasi-judicial or judicial channels, such as the Insurance Ombudsmen27, the
consumer courts or the civil courts.
PFRDA has put out a note on minimum common standards for ﬁnancial
advisers and ﬁnancial education28, but does not really have clear details for
grievance redressal on their website.
It is important to remember that each of the above redressal mechanism
is a general mechanism and does not speciﬁcally cater to the problems of
distribution. Also, more detailed studies need to be undertaken to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of any of the systems.
2.3 Critical problems in the current framework
The present regulatory framework still leaves several issues unresolved. These
include:
Conﬂict of interest Mutual fund distributors sell products of various prod-
uct providers, thereby leading to competition amongst providers to
achieve maximum sales through higher commissions to a distributor.
Similarly several distributors have licenses to sell both mutual fund
and insurance products, thereby leading to a situation where similar
products but under diﬀerent regulators get sold according to the com-
missions they provide. As noted earlier in the paper, this leads to a
26http://www.irda.gov.in/ADMINCMS/cms/NormalData_Layout.aspx?page=
PageNo225&mid=14.2
27The institution of Insurance Ombudsman was created by the Government of India
vide its notiﬁcation dated 11th November, 1998 to handle complaints of aggrieved insured
persons. Claimants who could not get their complaints redressed by insurers may get in
touch with the Ombudsman relevant to their states.
28Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection (2010)
12conﬂict of interest between serving the interest of the manufacturer
versus the interest of the customer.
Fragmented regulation While product regulators may have similar re-
quirements of distributors selling products under their purview, the
details of those requirements often diﬀer, leading to “regulatory arbi-
trage”. An example of this is the similarity between mutual funds and
ULIPs, regulated by the SEBI and IRDA respectively. Another exam-
ple, are employees of banks who come under the RBI, and not under
SEBI and IRDA even when they distribute ﬁnancial products.
Weak implementation SEBI and IRDA have a registration and licensing
procedure for distributors, a code of conduct and training requirements,
have powers to delicense in case of wrong-doing. Their attention to
mis-selling however, has been found to be lacking, and implementation
capacity on the ground is seen to be weak.
No standards for quality of advice While an objective deﬁnition of “good
advice” is diﬃcult in the best of circumstances, a basic deﬁnition of
“who-should-not-be-sold-what” is not in place in India. There is no
standard to which distributors can be held responsible for what they
sell.
Underdeveloped market for advice The popular means of selling ﬁnan-
cial products is through distributors remunerated through commissions.
There is a small ﬂedgling market of professional ﬁnancial planners, but
its penetration and impact is minuscule. The concept of paying for ad-
vice has yet to catch up with Indian customers, and continues to pose
a big challenge for policy-makers.
Problems of NPS While on the one hand, mutual fund and insurance
products are primarily driven through sales by agents, the NPS, does
not support a distributor led sales eﬀort. This is believed to be one rea-
son for the abysmally low penetration of the scheme.29 A product like
NPS can only work if there is awareness about the product amongst
customers such that they can seek the product themselves, or there
is a market of ﬁnancial planners, who for a fee, will recommend the
NPS if it suits the customers needs. As both these are missing at the
29As of September 2011, only about 55,000 customers are said to have signed up for the
NPS.
13moment, there is tremendous pressure on the PFRDA to drop the NPS
design and adopt the agent-led sales model (CRIISP, 2011). However,
an important aspect to bear in mind is that there has also not been
any eﬀort at educating customers about the NPS by the Government
of India, as was envisaged in the design of the NPS. An increase of
this eﬀort may prove to be more useful than taking the NPS along the
commissions driven sales route.
A parallel system for low income workers A disconcerting development
in Indian ﬁnance is a parallel system for low-income workers. Micro-
ﬁnance institutions, for example, have become the de-facto distributors
of credit and other ﬁnancial products to poor households. There is an
eﬀort towards bringing these under a separate legislation through the
Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, 2011.
As distributors of ﬁnancial products, they invariably also play the role
of advisers and there does not seem to be adequate appreciation of this
function in the regulatory debate.
2.4 Recent policy proposals
The need for reform in the distribution landscape has been felt for a long time
in India. One of the ﬁrst proposals on this subject was that of the Expert
Group on Protection of Interests of Small Investors and New Avenues for
Safe Investment of their Savings (GoI, 2005). Since then, there have been
two main attempts at reviewing and proposing reforms for the distribution
market in India. This section presents a brief summary of the latest two
reports.
2.4.1 USAID Report, 2007
USAID (2007) took a comprehensive look at the investment advice landscape
and made recommendations for regulating the same. Their main recommen-
dation was for regulation of investment advice by one regulator across all
ﬁnancial products. The critical idea of the report was that the regulatory
mechanism for investment advice should be robust enough to include all va-
rieties of advice and all types of investment adviser ﬁrms and individuals in
the business.
14Towards this goal, it suggested that the deﬁnition for advice should include
the following elements30: a) advice should be for compensation; b) adviser
should be engaged in the business of providing advice to others; c) this advice
may be provided directly or indirectly, through reports or other publications;
and d) advice could be as to the value of securities or as to the advisability
of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or as part of a ﬁnancial plan
in connection with providing ﬁnancial services.
With this deﬁnition of advice, the report identiﬁed three separate categories
of advisers depending on the discretion the adviser has on the funds of the
client. These are:
Investment Advisor These advise on behalf of the client and generally
have discretion and custody of their clients’ assets.
Financial Planner These typically prepare a ﬁnancial plan for their clients
and advise on multiple products that can become a part of the clients
portfolio and generally do not have discretion or custody over clients
assets.
Securities Distributor These advise customers only about the product
they are selling and do not provide broader investment advice like that
of the ﬁnancial planners. They also do not have discretion or custody
over their clients assets.
The Report called for registration of all three kinds of advisers as well as ﬁrms
and individuals. The apex body responsible for registration and regulation
should be a Regulatory Organisation (RO) in the form of a private, non-proﬁt
corporation authorized by the Government of India, but directed by and
subject to SEBI oversight. The Report deﬁned the RO’s mission statement
as
RO’s mission is to be a respected, eﬃcient and eﬃcacious
front line regulator of entities and professionals in the India’s
investment advice system. It should be responsive to the people it
regulates and investors and to market changes. It should enforce
India’s laws, SEBI’s regulations, and RO’s own rules; with equity
and justice, to provide a safe environment for India’s investors.
This Report recommended that the organisation should:
30USAID (2007), page 33.
15• Develop principle based regulations with risk based examinations
• Implement regulation of discrete market segments in phases
• Utilize information technology for registration and regulation of ﬁrms
and individuals.
Market conduct regulations set by the organization should include standards
for advertising, performance reporting and presentation, disclosure of fees,
conﬂicts, and conduct, and fair dealing.
The regulations would also subject all investment advisers to a ﬁduciary
duty, suitability guidelines, and protect client assets in the case of investment
advisers. While laying stress on regulation, the report pointed out that
increasing the competency of investment advisers was also a key role of the
regulator. It stressed that regulator should continually raise qualiﬁcation
standards and continuing education requirements for advisers, and to provide
for education conferences and meetings, and provide communication about
current market issues and other developments.
The report visualised SEBI as the oversight regulator with SEBI having the
duty of oversight, approval of rules and budgets for the RO and a review of
its performance.
2.4.2 The Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection, 2010
The Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection was set up by the
High-Level Coordination Committee on Financial Markets (HLCCFM) to
strengthen the ongoing eﬀorts for imparting ﬁnancial education and promot-
ing investor protection and submitted its report in March 2010.
The Committee was focused on regulating the three million insurance and
mutual fund sellers, including IFAs, bank oﬃcers (selling non-banking invest-
ment and credit products), and pension fund advisers who will also enter the
market once the New Pension System gets established.
The Committee’s view was that investor protection and investor education
need to be brought about together, as neither works in isolation. It pointed
out that while the network of agents had helped to create awareness, this
had not necessarily amounted to knowledge.
16The Report highlighted the low participation of Indian households in market
linked products and pointed out that a critical factor that can bring about a
change is the building of faith amongst consumers about risk-based ﬁnancial
products. One reason for the lack of faith has been the manner in which
products have been distributed. The presence of a trustworthy, regulated re-
tail intermediation industry, with common minimum standards will facilitate
the transition to greater household participation in ﬁnancial markets. To en-
sure regulation in this market for advice, the Committee clubbed all agents,
advisers and planners into one category. It also decided that the selling of
commissions based products will be treated as advice.31
Another aspect that was studied in depth by the Committee was the im-
portance of ﬁnancial literacy amongst the population. The Report informs
about the various measures taken by the regulators, product providers and
NGOs in improving knowledge about ﬁnance in India, as well as the expe-
rience on the same in international markets such as the US, UK, Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the OECD.
Against this background of the need for order and education in the market,
the Committee’s key recommendation consists of the setting up of the Fi-
nancial Well-Being Board of India (FINWEB). The goal of the organisation,
not surprisingly, would be to bring order to the adviser market and building
a ﬁnancially literate community. It will consist of two arms: one SRO arm
that will be responsible for bringing advisers under one common standard,
and a Financial Literacy arm that will work on promoting ﬁnancial literacy.
In addition the Committee had the following recommendations:
1. All retail ﬁnancial products to go no load by April 2011;
2. All ﬁnancial advisers to undergo a minimum knowledge-linked training pro-
gram, and selling of more complicated products to require a higher level of
education ;
3. All ﬁnancial advisers to be governed by a code of ethics that is standard
across products and organisations;
4. All products to abide by a disclosure template which will display the most
important terms and conditions of the products, and the amount an adviser
earns from the sale and maintenance of the product;
31Section 3.3, Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection (2010).
175. The sales process to be documented, along with customer proﬁling that took
place before a product was sold;
6. A common interface for grievance redressal; and
7. Financial literacy modules for Advisers, School students, Post Class XII
students, and other such entities to be developed by the Financial Literacy
arm. The Financial Literacy arm to be the focal point for all ﬁnancial
literacy initiatives in the country.
3 Way forward
Across the various reports, there has developed a general consensus on what
needs to be done to improve distribution of ﬁnancial products. The key areas
of consensus are:
• The need to set up a regulatory body to oversee distribution of ﬁnan-
cial products. This includes establishing a procedure of registration of
intermediaries, setting up of disclosure norms and suitability guidelines.
• The need to promote ﬁnancial literacy.
In September 2011, SEBI released a concept paper for regulating investment
advisers, where it separated the role of an adviser from that of a distributor.32
SEBI’s proposal includes the formation of a SRO which will regulate advisers
who will charge clients for advise on various products. These advisers will
not be remunerated by product providers. However, SEBI’s proposals leave
the actions for mis-selling, violation of code of conduct, conﬂict of interest for
products other than securities under the jurisdiction of regulators of other
product providers. Such a fragmented regulatory structure is not conducive
to the development of a market for advisory services.
The most critical lacunae in the discussions has been a lack of focus on
implementation. Besides clarity on implementation, three issues remain to
be addressed:
• It may not be enough for the regulatory authority to be a SRO, and
more importantly for it to be under the oversight of one regulator.
32For more details, refer to SEBI (2011).
18There needs to be uniformity in the standards that apply to distributors
of all ﬁnancial products, and the oversight of one regulator might not
work well for regulators of other products.
• There is still not a concerted eﬀort towards creating a body of ﬁnancial
planners who will only work for the customer and not the product
provider.
• There has been a complete lack of focus on credit. A large part of the
consumer ﬁnance regulation across the world has emerged because of
problems in mortgage and other credit markets. In India too, the MFI
crisis in Andhra Pradesh in October 2010 was essentially a crisis in the
market for micro-credit. However, there has been no concerted eﬀort at
acknowledging and resolving the problems of distribution in the credit
space.
The international response to the problem of distribution has gravitated to-
wards a complete ban of commissions and volume based payments, and a
heavy requirement from advisers to meet suitability standards.33 However,
it is important to point out that in many of these markets, investment is often
mandatory through retirement plans, and the penetration of these products
is also higher than in India. Agents play an important role in educating the
customer about modern ﬁnance as well as ﬁnancial products. To impose a
blanket ban on commissions, therefore, may not be the optimal response for
a transition economy like India.
The Indian market also suﬀers from a lack of a market for advice where
customers are not accustomed to paying for holistic advice. To ban commis-
sions before a body of ﬁnancial advisers comes into place may lead to a lower
household participation than it already is today. What is required, therefore,
is to provide an enabling environment for the development of the profession
of advice, while still allowing remuneration of agents by product providers,
provided it is made subject to higher standards than at present.
We propose a comprehensive two-fold response to the problem:
• Develop a market for holistic advice.
33A brief overview of the reform proposals in the US, UK, Australia and EU is presented
in the Appendix.
19• Develop solutions within the existing frame-work to ensure better dis-
tribution practices.
In what follows, we describe the proposed solutions to the problem of regu-
lating distribution intermediaries in the ﬁnancial markets. The ﬁrst proposal
deals with creating a regulatory framework for advice. The second deals with
organising the current market for distribution.
3.1 A market for advice
We propose a Financial Advisers Bill, 201234 and the setting up a new statu-
tory body, called the Institute of Financial Advisers of India (IFAI), with
the mandate of developing and regulating the profession of ﬁnancial advis-
ers. The proposed statute prescribes eligibility criteria to become a ﬁnancial
adviser; the process of registration as ﬁnancial adviser; the conditions of reg-
istration; general obligations of a ﬁnancial adviser; the disciplinary actions
that can be taken by the Institute in case of any misconduct of a ﬁnancial
adviser; provisions of appeal; redressal of grievances of clients, etc. This
framework aims to ensure a vibrant group of professionals who can render
competent ﬁnancial advice.
A statutory body is important because the profession of ﬁnancial advice
spans across all regulators, and a certain independence is required to not be
swayed in the direction of any single provider. It is not possible to house
this under any one existing regulator for reasons of political economy, and
an independent body with separate legal powers is considered to be more
eﬀective in regulating the profession of ﬁnancial advisers. The body would
need to have representation from all the four product regulators viz. SEBI,
IRDA, PFRDA and RBI.
A SRO model would face the limitation of not having adequate powers to
take rigorous action against misdemeanor that has the force of law. Given
the nascent stage of the advisory industry, the regulatory body also needs to
play a developmental role in providing an enabling framework for the growth
of the advisory industry on the one hand, and spread of ﬁnancial literacy
amongst the general population on the other. An SRO may not have the
focus on development.
34The draft Bill is presented in the Appendix
20The law that forms the statutory body would deﬁne the two key terms;
Financial advice and Financial advisers. The deﬁnition of ﬁnancial advice
proposed is:
any explicit or implicit recommendation, either directly or
through media i) to acquire, liquidate or continue to hold any
product in the portfolio and/or ii) to use, discontinue or continue
to use any service.
while a ﬁnancial adviser is:
any person who, for compensation for any kind, engages in
the business of providing ﬁnancial advice and includes any person
who holds himself out as a ﬁnancial adviser, by whatever name
called to others.35
This deﬁnition of ﬁnancial adviser will span all ﬁrms that service customers,
including such as micro-ﬁnance institutions, if they are in the business of
providing ﬁnancial advice to low-income customers. A ﬁnancial adviser needs
to only be an agent of the customer. The services may include custody of
client funds, in which case, more rigorous guidelines will apply.
A distributor who is an agent of the product provider would not be eligible
to be an adviser till he terminates his contract with the product provider. A
sales-agent, who only sells the product (without an element of advice) will
not be subject to the authority of the statutory body. In this sense, the
functions of an adviser and distributor (tied to a single or multiple product
providers) need to completely separated.
Regulating ﬁnancial advisers in the business of providing ﬁnancial advice as
deﬁned above would involve three core functions:
• Registration of advisers
• Setting standards for advice
• Resolving disputes
35There would be some exceptions for persons if the advice is solely incidental to some
other business or profession.
213.1.1 Registration of advisers
A key function of the statutory body will be to maintain a register of ﬁnancial
advisers, such that only people on the register will be allowed to perform the
function of providing ﬁnancial advice. The body may lay down criteria and
conditions that any individual or ﬁrm would have to meet to be able to
obtain a place in the register. These would include obtaining a minimum
level of proﬁciency that will need to be proved through examinations that
the institute will administer, either itself or through an approved agency. The
institute will also have the authority to take action against any individual or
ﬁrm found to be engaging in the business of ﬁnancial advice without explicit
permission from the institute. Sales agents, or distributors who do not have
a license from the institute and/or are remunerated by product providers,
will not be allowed to provide advice.
3.1.2 Professional standards
Financial advisers registered under the IFAI will be required to meet certain
professional standards in their knowledge set, and in the manner of providing
advice.36
Advisers will be required to update themselves about changing market trends
and products through continuing education programs, run by the institute or
through other approved agencies. This is extremely critical as new products
with complex features get introduced in the market, and it is the job of an
adviser to stay abreast of the full range of possibilities for their customers.
One approach to setting high standards for delivery of advice is to establish a
ﬁduciary duty of advisers. Fiduciaries are legally bound to act at all times for
the sole beneﬁt and interest of a beneﬁciary, i.e., the customer. A ﬁduciary
standard also implies that agents will have to avoid conﬂicts of interest. This
subsumes more detailed suitability regulations that have been put out by the
FSA in the UK and ASIC in Australia. One concern with detailed suitability
guidelines is that they can become onerous and leave no room for risk-taking
by customers. Risk-taking will be the customers prerogative, and there will
36An example in this direction is the Financial Planning Standards Board of India
(http://www.fpsbindia.org/), a public-private enterprise and a professional standards
setting body for ﬁnancial planners in India.
22need to be suﬃcient evidence that the customer was advised of the risks by
the adviser and has yet taken the decisions on his own accord.
Another approach is to ensure that all relevant information about the advis-
ers, their links to product providers (if any) are made known to the customer
at the time of sale, and through the duration of the relationship between the
adviser and the customer. Advisers will have the responsibility to ensure that
the customer has all the material available to make an informed decision.
3.1.3 Enforcement and grievance redressal
Recourse to justice is a critical component in engendering trust amongst
customers, and in setting incentives to not break the law. There need to
be provisions against fraud, manipulative practices including disclosing of
conﬁdential information about the customers to outside parties with strict
penal action to enforce such rules.
The IFAI will be given adequate powers to:
• Receive complaints against advisers, carry out necessary investigations
and enforce penal action on advisers if found guilty;
• Receive complaints against individuals/ﬁrms carrying out advisory ser-
vices without the requisite license and take them to court.
The institute needs to be authorised to enforce a wide range of actions against
errant advisers, including revoking or canceling the license to function as
an adviser. Only when the threat of punishment is real can it serve as a
disincentive to errant behaviour.
3.2 Regulating the distribution market
The development of a market for ﬁnancial advice is a long-term process
and it will be several years before such a market becomes vibrant and is
signiﬁcantly able to penetrate households. Meanwhile, there already exists
a huge machinery of product-provider driven agents, who continue to reach
out to consumers with various mutual fund and insurance products. It is
not optimal to dismantle this machinery before the market for advice has
23been established. Given the problems that pervade the sector, it is not
unreasonable to not let the status-quo remain either. Any change in the
current system is not possible without the co-ordination of the concerned
regulators, and a ﬁrst step would be for these regulators to come together
and agree upon a set of actions that will be undertaken, in a co-ordinated
fashion, across all products.
There are two things to bear in mind while framing regulations for the current
distribution market:
1. Product distribution is a component of product origination. As origina-
tion is the domain of the product regulator, so should be distribution.
2. Standards for product origination and distribution should be uniform
across all jurisdictions to avoid regulatory arbitrage.
3.2.1 Organising the distribution market
At the outset, eﬀort needs to be made to disentangle the function of advice
from that of distribution. While a distributor may provide a big service in
bringing various options to the doorstep of the customer, he does not provide
a holistic overview of both customers portfolio and the full range of product
availability. With the setting up of the IFAI, it may be possible to ensure
that a distributor remains a distributor only. It is not clear however, how
to organise the market for distributors and advisers in a nascent ﬁnancial
market with customers who are ﬁnancially unaware. For example, once an
adviser gives advice, a customer will need to ﬁnd distributors to actually
implement the advice. At the same time, there may be customers who do
not require the services of an adviser and want to access the products directly.
These will also need to tap into the network of execution-only agents. We
present three ways of organising the distribution market today.
1. Tied-agency model
In this model, distributors may only be sales agents of a particular product
provider and get remunerated by the same. This implies that an agent will
have to be tied to a product provider to avoid any conﬂict of interest. For
example, if the agent sells mutual funds of a particular mutual fund house,
then he may not sell funds from a competing house, or competing products
24such as unit-linked plans of insurance companies (See Figure 1).









The trade-oﬀ with a tied-agency model is that it can become onerous for
customers to locate agents for their purchase of ﬁnancial products. There
is great merit in achieving scale economies in distributing various ﬁnancial
products, and relying solely on a tied-agency model to deliver products may
not serve the purpose.
2. Combined advice-distribution model
Another approach to organising the market for distribution is to allow for
the advisory ﬁrm to also be able to sell ﬁnancial products.
Figure 2 Combined advice-distribution model
Manufacturer Tied Agent






This essentially implies there will be two kinds of agents (See Figure 2):
• Tied-agents who will only be able to sell products of one manufacturer.
25• Adviser-agents who will be able to sell products of more than one man-
ufacturer.
Tied-agents will get remunerated by the manufacturer and regulated by the
product regulator. Any agent who wants to sell more than one product will
be deemed to be providing advice and will have to seek certiﬁcation from the
IFAI and meet all the norms required of an adviser. Any sale emanating from
an adviser or an advisory ﬁrm will automatically be subject to suitability
requirements and all the standards set by the IFAI. The adviser-agent will
also get remunerated only by the customer.
The present model of distribution by banks falls under this category. Banks
which sell more than one product will be deemed adviser-agents in this model
and will be prohibited from collecting a commission from the product man-
ufacturer. Employees of banks who sell these products will have to obtain
certiﬁcation from the IFAI and will have to develop a pricing system to be
able to charge customers for dispensing advice and selling products.
Consumer protection in this framework might prove to be a challenge. It is
not diﬃcult to envisage situations where a ﬁrm may charge customers for
advice while in reality only pushing products they have the mandate to sell.
Also, if the advisory ﬁrm can only get remunerated by the customer, it may
serve as a disincentive to smaller players to enter into the distribution space,
leading to a further fall in household participation in ﬁnancial markets.
3. Grocery-store model
While it is imperative that individual agents who get paid by a product
provider are tied to the same, there is a case to be made for developing “stand-
alone” shops that will house all ﬁnancial products for sale. The remuneration
for these will have to come from the customer and not from the product
provider in the form of commissions. The analogy here would be chemist
shops which sell over-the-counter medicines for a price (See Figure 3.)
In this model, an adviser may be able to set-up a separate entity that sells
the products he recommends. The store will be able buy products directly
from the manufacturer and sell them to customers for a price. The adviser
will have to disclose his links with the grocery-store, and make it optional
for the customer to use his services. The customer will have the choice to go
to another distributor to implement the advice. Both the distribution ﬁrm
and advisory ﬁrm will come under the jurisdiction of the IFAI, as both will









be functioning as agents of the customer.
This model is similar to the adviser-agent model except that the adviser will
have to set-up a separate entity that sells products. Chinese walls between
two such activities may not be a suﬃcient safeguard against fraud, and may
lead to an increase in costs of operation.
3.3 Implementation
A peculiar aspect of Indian ﬁnance is the fragmented nature of regulation.
The market for ﬁnancial advice and the proposed reforms in the distribution
framework will eﬀect change only if steps are taken to actually implement
them.
Regulators and administrators need to take the Financial Advisers Bill, 2012,
forward to bring about the establishment of the IFAI and the development
of a body of ﬁnancial advisers.
In order to provide a framework of common standards across the distribution
of all ﬁnancial products, it is imperative that all regulators co-ordinate on
the organisation of the distribution market, setting of standards and their en-
forcement. The Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) should
facilitate the co-ordination. The Ministry of Finance, through its policy
27statements could direct regulators, through the FSDC to develop, monitor
and enforce common standards related to ﬁnancial product distribution. For
example, as a ﬁrst step, regulators could very quickly jointly mandate dis-
closure on the following:
• The rupee amount that is paid to the distributor at the time of pur-
chase, and the subsequent fees that are deducted over the course of the
investment. This is important also because it will enable advisers to
select from various products for their customers.
• Minimum amount of contributions required before the product lapses.
• Details on the exit clause.
• Risk characteristics of the product.
In practice disclosure is not seen to be having the intended eﬀects (Beshears,
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2010). It
is found that subjects often do not understand loads, overlook them, and do
not make the most optimal choices. While improved disclosure will certainly
help in providing the much needed information, it is not going to solve the
full set of problems related to mis-selling. It is, however, a necessary ﬁrst
step.
4 Conclusion
One of the goals of policy is to maximize the ﬁnancial well-being of cus-
tomers. This includes providing an environment that enables households to
allocate their savings eﬃciently across various products and safeguards their
interests. The current distribution landscape with high commissions and
perverse incentives where the distributor is the agent of both the product
provider and customer is not conducive to promoting the goal of customer
protection.
This paper proposes a complete segregation of advice from that of distribu-
tion. Financial advisers should be recognised as professionals and be regu-
lated under a new institute called the Institute of Financial Advisers of India.
At the same time, regulation of distributors should continue to remain under
28the purview of the product regulators, as product distribution is a compo-
nent of product origination. Ministry of Finance and the Financial Stability
and Development Council need to play a role to co-ordinate the setting of
common standards for distribution across all product regulators.
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31Appendix
A Pattern of investments
Table A.1 Pattern of investments
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) runs a system named Consumer Pyramids,
which is a household survey database with a panel of 140,000 households measured every
quarter. Information about percentage of households that have invested in the various
savings instruments in the quarter of July 2011 is reported in this table. Households may
have invested in more than one instrument.
Savings Instruments Percent of Households that have invested in
Fixed deposits 25.32
Bonds 0.48
Post oﬃce savings 8.86
National Savings Certiﬁcates 0.79







Real estate / housing 75.54
Other ﬁnancial instruments 6.66
Source: Consumer Pyramids, July 2011
B International experience
The complexity of the problem of distribution is faced in all countries, and
the demand for better regulation of advice has grown stronger after the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis. While a large focus of these discussions is the mortgage and
credit market, especially in the US, the need for regulating distribution of
other ﬁnancial products is also well accepted.
The underlying model in most countries has been a agent-based model driven
by commissions from product providers. However, regulation today is headed
32towards another extreme of a complete ban of commissions and volume based
payments to advisers as is evident from the reforms underway in the UK and
Australia. There is also a move to strengthen legislation that will require
advisers to be more diligent in establishing “suitability” checks before any
product is sold to the customer.
In this section we brieﬂy describe the policy approach of various countries
on ﬁnancial product distribution.
B.1 United States
The oldest piece of legislation on this subject is the Investment Advisers Act,
1940 in the United States which sets a ﬁduciary duty for investment advisers.
The Act deﬁnes an investment adviser (IA) as:
any person37 who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writ-
ings, as to the value of securities38 or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for com-
pensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities.
Advisers in the US are regulated at the state and the federal level. If an
adviser functions in one state only, then regulations of that particular state
apply. However, if the adviser functions in more than one state, or functions
in one state but has assets under management of not less than US$25 million,
or is an adviser to a company registered under Title 1 of the Act, then the
federal Act applies.39
Advisers are required to register with the Commission40 by submitting par-
ticulars such as education, aﬃliation, net-worth and also information on a)
the nature of the business of the adviser including the manner of giving ad-
vice and analyses, b) the nature of the authority of the adviser with respect
37Person means a natural person or company.
38Security encompasses a range of ﬁnancial products including stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, and derivatives among others.
39For more details, refer to Section 203A of The Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
40The Commission refers to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
33to clients’ funds and accounts, and c) the basis on which the adviser is com-
pensated. The Commission retains the authority to not grant registration,
or place limitations, revoke or cancel the registration of an adviser if doing
so is in public interest.41 The Act prohibits actions by advisers that may
defraud any client and provides the Commission with the authority to levy
strict monetary (and other) penalties in case of violation of the law.
Despite the prevalence of the Act, it was felt that advisers to hedge funds and
private equity funds who were outside its purview42, needed to be brought
in to close the regulatory gap. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 has sought to
bridge such gaps by bringing in these advisers under the regulatory fold.
The other lacunae in the US was the lack of a single agency to oversee and
regulate the entire spectrum of consumer ﬁnance products. The latest ef-
fort in this regard is the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection43 within
the Federal Reserve set up under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) to regulate products such
as credit, deposits, on-line banking, property purchases and ﬁnancial advi-
sory services. The Bureau aims to educate customers against defensive prac-
tices, enforce federal consumer ﬁnancial laws and restrict unfair, deceptive
or abusive practices, and study consumers, providers and markets. While
the Bureau’s ﬁrst task is to solve the problems in the mortgage market, the
Bureau is eventually expected to turn its attention to other consumer ﬁnance
products.
The thrust of the Bureau seems to be on regulating disclosure and ensuring
transparency in the products that are sold to the customer. In addition, the
Bureau aims to promote ﬁnancial literacy to enable customers to make better
choices in the ﬁnancial products space.
41The Act carefully deﬁnes public interest as well as conditions which could bring upon
such an action on the adviser. It also requires the Commission to provide for a hearing
before any such action is taken.
42Advisers to private funds were not required to register with the SEC because of an
exemption that applied to advisers with fewer than 15 clients. This exemption counted
each fund as a client, as opposed to each investor in a fund. As a result, some advisers
remained outside of regulatory oversight even if they were managing large sums of money
for the beneﬁt of hundreds of investors.
43http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
34B.2 United Kingdom
The Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 provides the framework for
dealing with ﬁnancial distribution in the UK. The Financial Services Au-
thority puts out a Code of Business Source-book (COBS) for ﬁrms accepting
deposits, conducting designated investment business and carrying on long-
term insurance business in relation to life policies and also has a Speciﬁc
Conduct of Business source-books for insurance intermediaries, mortgages
and home ﬁnance ﬁrms, and banking.
The COBS has provisions related to risk categorisation of customers, infor-
mation dissemination, and suitability reports on recommendations made by
ﬁrms to clients. However, a review of the investment advice found half of
the recommendations to be unsuitable from the point of view of the risk a
customer was willing and able to take. The FSA has, therefore, required
ﬁrms to establish processes to assess risk appetite of customers, and engage
customers in a suitability assessment process as well (Financial Services Au-
thority, 2011).
The FSA also launched a Retail Distribution Review (RDR) in June 2006.
The RDR focused primarily on looking at how investments were being dis-
tributed to retail customers and it was found that competition between ad-
visers was more about recommending a particular provider’s products, and
less about the usefulness of the product to the customer directly. The re-
port sought to improving the process of ﬁnancial advice and improving the
clarity with which services are described to customers, both through higher
standards for advisers and better remuneration practices of advisers. The
key proposals include:
• Banning commission-based remuneration system;
• Setting up two kinds of advisers: independent advisers who get remu-
nerated by the client, and restricted advisers who can advice only on
their range of products;
• Raising the minimum level of qualiﬁcation for investment advisers and
enhanced standards for continuing professional development;
• Setting up an overarching Code of Ethics;
• Increasing the minimum capital requirement for all personal investment
35ﬁrms from £10,000 to £20,000. Firms will also be required to hold ad-
ditional capital as provision against potential liability for any activities
excluded by their professional indemnity insurance policies.44
These reforms are going to take eﬀect from the end of 2012, and will impact
on all regulated ﬁrms producing or distributing retail investment products
and services, including banks, building societies, insurers, wealth managers
and ﬁnancial advisers (Financial Services Authority, 2009).
It is hoped that with the RDR, the inﬂuence of the provider on the adviser will
diminish. However, it is also expected that providers will now use alternative
routes to market their products, and one possibility could be the integration
of providers and advisory ﬁrms. There might also be an impact on the market
structure, with smaller ﬁrms exiting the market or merging with larger ﬁrms
(Oxera, 2009).
B.3 Australia
Australia was one of the ﬁrst countries to separate out prudential regulation
from distribution regulation and has a dedicated regulator for customer pro-
tection, called the Australian Securities Investment Commission (ASIC).45
The legal framework for the regulation of advisers under ASIC is the Corpo-
ration Act, 2001 and the Regulatory Guide 146, 175 of ASIC. This provides
detailed deﬁnitions of what constitutes a ﬁnancial product, and ﬁnancial ser-
vice. Financial product advice is clearly deﬁned to be a ﬁnancial service. All
personal advice is required to comply with a ‘suitability’ rule or ‘reasonable
basis for advice’ rule, which involves the adviser taking the trouble to under-
stand clients personal circumstances, and ensure the appropriateness of the
advice.
Financial advisers are required to hold a Australian Financial Services Li-
cense (AFSL), and comply with the disclosure requirements. These include
the giving of a Financial Services Guide to each retail client and a detailed
statement of advice which sets out the advice and the basis on which it was
given, and all information on remuneration (and other beneﬁts) the adviser
44This requirement is part of the Review of prudential rules for personal investment
ﬁrms, 2008.
45http://www.asic.gov.au.
36(or a related entity) may receive, and information on any relationship of the
adviser that may have inﬂuenced the particular advice. Advisers also have
to meet certain training and competency requirements.
The curious feature of the Australian market is that there is a combination of
remuneration arrangements. There are fee-for-service advisers who get paid
directly by the customer, and there continue to exist commissions, bonuses
and soft-dollar incentives ﬁnanced by the product providers. The existence
of customer-based and provider-based fees has led to most remuneration still
coming from the product provider thereby diluting the development of a
customer-focused market for advise. In 2008, Australia was rocked by scan-
dals such as the collapse of Storm Financial46, which led to a consensus on
the need to review and reform the current state of aﬀairs on ﬁnancial product
distribution.
This has culminated in the The Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) pack-
age. The FOFA reforms focus on improving the quality of ﬁnancial advice
and expanding the availability of more aﬀordable forms of advice. The key
proposals of FOFA include:
• Banning of up-front and trailing commissions;
• Banning of volume based payments;
• Banning of soft-dollar beneﬁts47;
• Setting up a statutory best interest duty for ﬁnancial advisers;
• An opt-in scheme whereby clients will have to agree to paying fees to
advisers every two years;
• Providing the option of ‘scaled advise’ instead of ‘holistic advise’;
• A compensation scheme whereby clients will have to be compensated
for bad/unsuitable advice.48
Australia has moved further ahead than the UK in seeking a complete ban
of commissions and other volume based payments. There is no provision to
allow for ‘tied-agents’ as allowed for under the RDR.
46For more details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storm_Financial.
47This is deﬁned as any beneﬁt received by a ﬁnancial planning ﬁrm, its representatives
or associates, other than basic monetary commissions or direct client advice fees.
48For more details see (John, 2011).
37B.4 European Union
The EU set up a group to work on Packaged Retail Investment Products
(PRIPs) in 2009 under its Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Mi-
FID) Implementing Directive. The focus of this group was on pre-contractual
product disclosures and rules on sales practices. The Commission committed
itself to developing a new, horizontal legislative approach in these two areas,
drawing on the best of existing requirements but applying these to all rele-
vant products and sales channels so as to achieve a consistent and coherent
overall approach (EU, 2009). The key proposals include:
• Harmonised requirements for disclosure across retail investment prod-
ucts. This includes requirements for disclosures to be fair, and clear,
using plain language and a short format.
• Sales requirements
38C The Financial Advisors Bill, 2012
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